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"No Direction Home:" The Law and Criminal
Defendants With Mental Disabilities
Michael L. Perlin
Michael L. Perlin is a professor of law at New York Law
School. From 1974-82, he was director of the Division of Mental
Health Advocacy in the N.J. Department of the Public Advocate.
He is on the NationalAdvisory Board of the Institute on Mental
Disability and Law of the National Center for State Courts, and
has written more than 100 articles on mental disability law. He
was the 1994 recipient of the Manfred Guttmacher Award for.
The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade ago, I suggested that the U.S. Supreme
Court was attracted to cases involving criminal defendants with mental disabilities and the criminal trial
process "like the moth to the flame."' It seemed to me
that the Court was inexorably drawn to those criminal
law and procedure cases that turned on questions of a
defendant's mental state in a variety of settings extending
far beyond the relatively simple conceptual questions of
determining, for example, which substantive test to
employ in assessing whether a defendant is responsible
for a criminal act or competent to stand trial.
It was not entirely clear to me why the Court was so
attracted. At one time, I speculated that there might be a
psychodynamic explanation for the Court's preoccupation with this relatively narrow area of the law, and I
hinted that the Court remained a "prisoner of external
symbols and internal impulses," 2 "[shuffling and juggling] symbols, public perceptions, and internal, perhaps
unconscious ambivalences. ' '3 I concluded that the court's
"random decisions" led to a "doctrinal abyss" in which
opinions were handed down "out of consciousness." ' 4 As
in Bob Dylan's paradigm-shattering song, Like A Rolling
Stone,5 litigators, scholars and judges were offered "no
direction home" by the Court's doctrinally-incoherent
decisions.
Little has changed. The Supreme Court has frequently
returned to this area of the law in the intervening decade,
as have state and other federal courts and legislatures.
Case law and statutory developments proliferate. Many
of these developments flow directly from the most
discussed mental disability case in American history: the
shooting of then-President Ronald Reagan by John W.
Hinckley on March 30, 1981. It was Hinckley's "successful" use of the insanity defense that unleashed political
and social "fury ' 6 that led to a "passionate" 7 debate that
became a "surrogate' 8 for all that was allegedly "wrong"
with our criminal justice system. Senators and conserva-

tive think-tank spokespersons declaimed that insanity
defense abolition was the Maginot line at which "nothing
less than the credibility of our Federal justice system
[was] at stake." 9
Although insanity defense opponents fell short of their
immediate goal-abolition of the defense in the federal
courts-the legislative firestorm that followed the entry
of a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) verdict in
Hinckley's case dramatically and irrevocably altered the
legal landscape for the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding several important (and in some cases startling)
victories for criminal defendants with mental disabilities
in the Supreme Court, the post-Hinckley world is still one
in which nonresponsibility verdicts are rare, incompetency inquiries limited, and explorations of the ways that a
defendant's mental illness contributed to the commission
of an otherwise-inexplicable act are cramped.' 0
What lessons can be learned from the past two decades? Is there, finally, any doctrinal coherence in this
area? Are there "bright lines" that can be drawn to help
illuminate this difficult area of the law, and aid us in
predicting the future? Can we profitably read the Suor, is there still "no
preme Court's "tea leaves,"'
direction home"? This essay attempts to address these
overriding questions by examining the insanity defense,
competency to stand trial, the death penalty, and the right
are other
to refuse treatment, recognizing that there
12
important issues that will not be covered.
II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Statutory Developments
3
The jury's NGRI verdict in United States v. Hinckley
overshadows (and to a great extent preordains) all other
developments in this area of the law. In the wake of that
verdict, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984,14 which dramatically changed the insanity
defense in the federal circuits. 5 The law:
* Shifted the burden of proof to defendants by a quantum
6
of clear and convincing evidence;
* Articulated, for the first time, a version of the
M'Naghten test even more restrictive than the one
handed down by the British House of Lords in 1843 (that
a defendant with a severe mental disease or defect, either
did not know the nature and quality of his act, or did not
know the wrongfulness of his act);' 7
e Established strict procedures for the hospitalization and
release of defendants found NGRI;18 and
* Severely limited the scope of expert testimony admissible in insanity trials, by barring opinion evidence on
"whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
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state or condition constituting an element of the crime
charged or of a defense thereto."9
State legislatures quickly followed suit. In the six years
after Hinckley's assassination attempt, two-thirds of all
states made changes in their insanity defense statutes.
Seven states narrowed the substantive test (by replacing
the American Law Institute (ALl) test with the
M'Naghten formulation), 16 shifted the burden of proof
to the defendant, and 25 tightened release procedures in
cases of defendants found to be NGRI. 20 Several states
"abolished" the insanity defense, retaining only a limited
mens rea defense, 2' and the Supreme Court denied a
defendant's petition for certiorari stemming from an
22
unsuccessful challenge to one of the abolition statutes.
Other states-in an effort to insure that mentally ill
defendants did not "slip through the cracks"-enacted
guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) legislation. These laws
allowed for the criminal conviction and imprisonment of
defendants with mental illnesses who did not meet the
insanity standard. These laws have been almost universally criticized as doing little to ensure effective treatment
for offenders with mental disabilities, providing only 23a
cosmetic "reform" that assuages jurors and legislators.

him on that basis. 3' The Court rejected the state's
argument that Foucha's anti-social personality disorder
provided a permissible rationale for future institutionalization. First, because the disorder was not considered a
mental illness under Louisiana law, Foucha could not be
civilly committed. Second, if he could no longer be held
as an insanity acquittee, he was entitled, per Jones, to
constitutionally adequate procedures to establish permissible grounds for his confinement. Third, because of the
"fundamental nature" of his "right to liberty, '32 Foucha-who had never been convicted of a. crime-could
not be punished. As the state had not shown by clear and
was
convincing evidence that he had a mental illness and 33
dangerous, he could no longer be institutionalized.
Justice Thomas dissented, raising the possibility of
"calculated abuse of the insanity defense" by feigning
defendants, and speculated on how the public might react
34
to the release of a serial killer immediately after trial.

C. Empirical Realities
Our insanity defense jurisprudence has always been
shrouded in myth. Perhaps the most important meta-legal
development in the past 20 years has been the publication
of data disproving each of the basic myths that have
provided much of the basis for legislative "reform." It is
B. Case Law
The Supreme Court has considered insanity acquittee now clear that the insanity defense is not overused, that
retention procedures twice in the past 15 years. In Jones its use is not limited to murder cases, that there is a
v. United States, 24 it clarified the federal constitutional significant risk to the defendant who pleads insanity, that
limits on the disposition of insanity acquittees, sanction- insanity acquittees are not quickly released from custody,
ing automatic commitment based on an insanity acquit- that insanity acquittees generally spend more time in
of like offenses, and
tal, allowing both for a far less stringent standard of proof custody than defendants convicted
question
as
to the presence of
is
rarely
any
that
there
35
than
in
involuntary
at NGRI commitment proceedings
mental illness in an insanity-pleading defendant.
major
civil commitment cases (where the burden must be on the
Ground-breaking research published by Henry Steadman
state by at least clear and convincing evidence) 25 and for
data base of
post-insanity commitments to last for longer terms than and his associates provides a comprehensive
36
The
its
consequences.
use
of
the
plea
and
the
actual
26
the underlying crime's maximum sentence. And state
is in incorporating
decisionmakers
challenge
that
faces
courts quickly followed Jones by approving similar limitations in state cases. 27 Jones and its progeny appeared to Steadman's research into future legislative and adminisbe responsive to the public's furious reaction to the trative change in this area.
Hinckley verdict 28 and it seemed highly unlikely that any
insanity acquittee would be successful at the Supreme D. Conclusion
The development of the insanity defense has always
Court level at any time in the indefinite future.
In 1992, the Supreme Court returned to insanity tracked the tensions between psychodynamics and punacquittee issues in Foucha v. Louisiana,29 addressing the ishment, and has reflected our most profound moral
question of whether an insanity acquittee could be ambivalence about both. We are especially punitive
retained if he no longer had a mental illness, but was toward defendants who successfully plead insanity (whom
potentially dangerous. In that case, there was no evidence we perceive as the most "despised" and most "morally
that the defendant continued to have a mental illness, repugnant" group of individuals in society);3 7 yet, we
although he was diagnosed with an anti-social personality recognize that, in some narrow and carefully circumscribed circumstances, exculpation is both proper and
disorder and once had a drug-induced psychosis.3 0
In a sharply split opinion, the Supreme Court reversed necessary. This ambivalence has traditionally driven
a Louisiana supreme court decision that had found that criminal justice policy, not simply toward insanity-pleadthe continued retention of an insanity acquittee who was ing defendants, but toward nearly all other criminal
potentially dangerous, but had no mental illness, did not defendants with mental disabilities as well.38
The paradox, though, is that just as we are learningoffend the constitution. According to Justice White's
majority opinion, which relied on O'Connor v. Donald- beyond cavil-that our beliefs about the misuse and
son, since the basis for holding Foucha as an insanity overuse of the insanity defense are nothing more than
acquittee had disappeared, the state could no longer hold myth, we rewrite legislation to make it even more
606 • MPDLR ° VOL 20 No 5

unlikely that the defense will be successfully pled. Although Foucha drew at least one clear line (barring the
further institutionalization of an insanity acquittee who
currently has no mental illness), Justice Thomas' dissent
articulates the fears and the worries that continue to drive
policymakers. Here, there is clearly "no direction home."
III. INCOMPETENCY
A. Introduction
The incompetency inquiry remains-numerically-the
most important intersection between mental disability
and the criminal law process. Many of the significant
issues appear well-settled-e.g., the substantive standard, 39 the constitutional dimensions, 40 and the procedures governing retention of defendants found incompetent to stand trial. 4' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
revisited this area of the law on three separate occasions
in the past four years. Two of the decisions illustrated the
constitutional limits on the burden of proof at the
incompetency to stand trial proceeding. The third-by
far the most controversial-addressed "the question of
whether the competency standard for assessing guilty
pleas or counsel waivers need be any higher than that for
standing trial.
B. Burden of proof
In Medina v. California,42 the Supreme Court upheld a
California statute that placed the burden of proof on the
defendant to prove incompetency by a preponderance of
the evidence. According to the majority, this allocation
did not "offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental. '43 As there was neither a "settled tradition" on the proper allocation of the burden nor a
"historical basis" for suggesting that its allocation to the
defendant violated due process, the court rejected the
required
defendant's argument that fundamental fairness
44
that the burden be placed on the state.
In its most recent term, the Court struck down an
Oklahoma statute that had allocated this burden to the
defendant by a quantum of clear and convincing evidence
in Cooper v. Oklahoma.45 In a unanimous opinion, the
Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, reversed, emphasizing that the 46trial of an incompetent defendant violated
due process.
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it
depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to
a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of
counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to crossexamine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own
47
behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.
Justice Stevens concluded that a heightened standard
"offends a principle of justice that is deeply 'rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people.' "48
The court then turned to the question of fundamental
fairness, and concluded that the Oklahoma rule imposed
"a significant risk of an erroneous determination that the

defendant is competent," a risk that carries with it "dire
consequences. ' 49 On the other hand, the court characterized the potential harm to the state-if the defendant
were malingering-as no more than "modest." 5 0
C. A Unitary Standard
In 1993, the Supreme Court, per Justice Thomas,
resolved a lower court split on whether a single competency standard governed all competence inquiries in the
criminal trial process, ruling, in Godinez v. Moran,5 that
such a unitary standard was all that was required, since a
defendant who was found competent to stand trial would
have to make a variety of decisions: whether to testify;
whether to seek a jury trial; whether to cross-examine his
accusers; and in some cases, whether to raise an affirmative defense. 52 While the decision to plead guilty, for
example, is a "profound one, it is no more complicated
than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may53be
called upon to make during the course of a trial."
Using the same reasoning, it also found that the
standard for waiving counsel was the same one as for
being competent to stand trial, concluding that there was
"no reason" to believe that the decision to waive counsel
required an "appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional
rights.

'5 4

Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that "competence" had multiple meanings:
[T]he majority cannot isolate the term "competent" and
apply it in a vacuum, divorced from its specific context. A
person who is "competent" to play basketball is not
thereby "competent" to play the violin. The majority's
monolithic approach to competency is true to neither life
nor the law. Competency for one purpose does not
translate to competency for another purnecessarily
pose. 55
He concluded:
To try, convict, and punish one so helpless to defend
himself contravenes fundamental principles of fairness
and impugns the integrity of our criminal justice system. I
cannot condone the decision to accept, without further
inquiry, the self-destructive "choice" of a person who was
so deeply medicated and who might well have been
56
severely mentally ill.

D. Conclusion
The decisions in Medina and Cooperare not surprising,
and their most important legacy may be their reliance on
history and tradition in assessing whether a due process
violation is to be found, a reliance that is curious in this
area given the dizzying speed with which new research
continues to illuminate the underlying clinical and behavioral issues. 57 The contrast between the formulaic majority and the textured dissent in Godinez reflects all the
tension that exists in this area of the law. 5s Although the
Supreme Court has spoken definitively in Godinez, it has
not enlightened us on the underlying issues.
MPDLR • SEPT-OCT 1996 - 607
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IV. THE DEATH PENALTY 59
A. Introduction
Society has always feared that extending procedural
due process protections to mentally ill criminals in death
penalty cases might either "open the floodgates" to
spurious claims or encourage malingering as a means of
"cheating the electric chair." On the other hand, a
significant fear remains of judicial rules that would
sanction state behavior that "shocks the conscience" or
violates "fundamental fairness" in cases involving profoundly and clearly psychotic defendants who are subject
to capital punishment. 60 This ambivalence is reflected in
all developments in this area of the law.
B. "Aggravators" and "Mitigators"
1. Definitions
Contemporary death penalty statutes require findings
of "mitigating" and "aggravating" factors. This is ostensibly done to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for
only the vilest of crimes (for which there is no reasonable
excuse or justification). "Mitigators" include a finding
that the "defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute
a defense to prosecution," and that his "capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or intoxication, but not to a' 61degree sufficient to constitute a defense
to prosecution."
The critical importance of mitigating evidence at the
penalty stage cannot be overstated. The sentencing authority thus must consider any relevant mitigating evidence that a defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less
than death, 62 according to Gregg v. Georgia63 and other
initial "modem" decisions upholding the death penalty,
which mandated that the sentencing authority be provided with adequate individualized information about de64
fendants, and guided by clear and objective standards.
2. The Importance of Lockett and Eddings
In Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme Court substantially
widened the scope of mitigating evidence allowed at the
penalty phase of a capital case, concluding:
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record . .. that
defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
65
death.

Four years later, the Court expanded on its Lockett rule
in Eddings v. Oklahoma,66 holding that the sentencing
authority must consider any relevant mitigating evi67
dence.
3. Penry and Mitigation
Finally, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court's most recent
merits decision on this question involving a defendant
608 , MPDLR • VOL 20 No 5

with mental disabilities, the Supreme Court held that
evidence of a defendant's mental retardation was relevant
to his culpability and that, without such information,
jurors could not express their "'reasoned moral response'" in determining the appropriateness of the death
penalty. 68 The court found that assessment of the defendant's retardation would aid the jurors in determining
whether the commission of the crime was "deliberate";
without a special instruction as to such evidence, a juror
might be unaware that his evaluation of the defendant's
moral culpability could be based on the defendant's
retardation. 69 Justice Scalia flayed the majority in his
concurrence/dissent, characterizing it as countenancing
"an unguided, emotional, 'moral response' . . . an
an unfocused
outpouring '70of personal reaction .
sympathy.
C. Mental Disability and Execution
Mental disability is important in the death penalty
process in other ways as well. The issue of executing the
insane has plagued the legal system for centuries, and
attempts at prescribing appropriate standards "have
proved incoherent because they failed to confront the
reality that law and psychiatry rarely, if ever, exist
separately from culture and politics."'"
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Ford v. Wainwright72 brought limited doctrinal coherence to this
question. In Ford, a fractured court7 3 concluded that the
eighth amendment did prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty on an insane prisoner.7 4 On this point,
Justice William Rehnquist dissented on behalf of himself
and Chief Justice Burger.75 In his view, the Florida
procedures were "fully consistent with the 'common-law
heritage' and current practice on which the Court purport[ed to rely," and, in their reliance on executivebranch procedures, "faithful to both traditional and
modem practice. ' 76 He thus rejected the majority's
conclusion that the eighth amendment created77 a substantive right not to be executed while insane.
Ford is especially perplexing in light of the Court's
subsequent decision in Penry v. Lynaugh,78 in which it
rejected the argument that the defendant's mental retardation barred capital punishment. 79 Although she conceded that the execution of the "profoundly or severely
retarded" might violate the Eighth Amendment, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor suggested that such persons were
unlikely to be convicted or face that penalty in light of
"the protections afforded by the insanity defense today,"80 an observation astonishing either in its naivete or
its cynicism. 8 '
D. Conclusion
While the Supreme Court continues to adhere to the
Eddings/Lockett line of cases, Justice Scalia's opinion on
mitigation in Penry-coupled with the majority in Godinez and Justice Thomas' dissent in Riggins (discussed
below)-suggests a potentially major fissure in this area
of jurisprudence.8 2 This conflict becomes even more

pronounced in light of the seemingly-irreconcilable opinions on capacity-to-be-executed in Fordand Penry. Here,
yet again, the Court offers us "no direction home."
V. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
A. Introduction
No area of civil mental disability law has been more
contentious than that of the right to refuse treatment. The
question of the right to refuse antipsychotic medication
remains the most important and volatile aspect of the
legal regulation of mental health practice. The issues that
are raised--the autonomy of institutionalized individuals with mental disabilities to refuse the imposition of
treatment that is designed (at least in part) to ameliorate
their symptomatology, the degree to which individuals
subjected to such drugging are in danger of developing
irreversible neurological side effects, the evanescence of
such terms as "informed consent" or "competency," the
practical and administrative considerations of implementing such a right in an institutional setting, and the
range of the philosophical questions raised--mark the
litigation that has led to the articulation of the right to
refuse treatment as "a turning point in institutional
psychiatry" and "the most controversial issue in forensic
psychiatry today."'83 In the past decade, attention has
turned to the application of this doctrine to the criminal
trial process. Three Supreme Court decisions and a pair
of Fourth Circuit opinions reflect the lack of direction of
the jurisprudence in this area of criminal law.
B. In Criminal Law Settings
1. Defendants Awaiting Trial
In 1987, a Fourth Circuit panel issued the first decision
in United States v. Charters4 (Charters1) on the right of a
federal pre-trial detainee to refuse psychotropic medication. Charters I rejected the notion that the "exercise of
professional judgment standard" articulated by the Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo applied to antipsychotic medication cases, resurrected long-abandoned
right-to-privacy and freedom-of-thought-process arguments, established a right to be free from unwanted
physical intrusion as an integral part of an individual's
constitutional freedoms, and articulated a complex substituted judgment-best interests methodology to be used
in right to refuse treatment cases. 85
On en banc rehearing, the full Fourth Circuit vacated
the panel decision (Charters II), "suggesting that the
panel was wrong about almost everything."'8 6 Although it
agreed that the defendant possessed a constitutionally
retained interest in freedom from bodily restraint that
was implicated by the forced administration of psychotropic drugs and was protected "against arbitrary and
capricious action by government officials," '8 it found
that informal institutional administrative procedures
were adequate to protect the defendant's due process
interests. It applied the "substantial professional judgment" test of Youngberg, and limited questioning of
experts to one matter: "[W]as this decision reached by a

process so completely out of professional bounds as to
make it explicable only as an arbitrary, nonprofessional
one?" 88 Although the court briefly acknowledged the
possibility of side-effects (a factor stressed heavily in
ChartersI), it quickly dismissed the magnitude of their
potential harm by noting that they were simply "one
element" to be weighed in a best-interests decision. Here,
the court conceded that it did not do an exhaustive
analysis of the conflicting literature before it, demurring
to that literature's importance:
It suffices to observe that while there is universal agreement in the relevant professional discipline that sideeffects always exist as a risk, there is wide disagreethose disciplines as to the degree of their
ment within
severity.8 9
2. Defendants Pleading Insanity
Mental disability law jurisprudence seemed to take a
dramatic turn in the Supreme Court's decision in Riggins
v. Nevada.90 Riggins held that the use of antipsychotic
drugs violated a defendant's right to a fair trial (at which
he had raised the insanity defense), focusing on the drugs'
potential side-effects, and construing its previous decision in Washington v. Harper9' -which limited the rights
of convicted prisonersto refuse medication-to require an
"overriding justification and a determination of medical
appropriateness" prior to forcibly administering antipsychotic medications to a prisoner.9 2 It focused on what
might be called the "litigational side-effects" of antipsychotic drugs, and discussed the possibility that the drug
use might have "compromised" the substance of the
defendant's trial testimony, his interaction with counsel,
and his comprehension of the trial. 93
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (the author
of Harper)took an even bolder position. He would not
allow the use of antipsychotic medication to make a
defendant competent to stand trial "absent an extraordinary showing" on the state's part, and noted further that
he doubted this showing could be made "given our
94
present understanding of the properties of these drugs."
Justice Thomas dissented, suggesting: (1) the administration of the drug might have increased the defendant's
cognitive ability; 95 (2) since Riggins had originally asked
for medical assistance (while a jail inmate, he had "had
trouble sleeping" and was "hearing voices"), it could not
be said that the state ever "ordered" him to take
medication; 96 (3) if Riggins had been aggrieved, his
proper remedy was a §1983 civil rights action; 97 and (4)
under the majority's language, a criminal conviction
might be reversed in cases involving "penicillin or
aspirin."98
3. Convicted Prisoners
The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Harper
abruptly limited the right of convicted felons to refuse
treatment under the federal constitution. While the Court
agreed that prisoners (like all other citizens) possessed a
"significant liberty interest" in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs, 99 it found that the
MPDLR
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need to balance this interest with prison safety and
security considerations would lead it to uphold a prison
rule regulating forced administration of drugs as long as it
was "'reasonably related to legitimate penological interest,"' even where fundamental interests were otherwise
implicated.'l ° Thus, a state policy that provided for an
administrative hearing (before a tribunal of mental health
professionals and correctional officials) at which there
was neither provision for the appointment of counsel nor
regularized external review passed constitutional mus0
ter.l'
In a sharply-worded opinion, Justice Stevens dissented,
arguing that the refusal of medication was "a fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest order of protection," especially where the imposition of such medications might create "a substantial risk of permanent injury
and premature death."' 1 2 Harper clarifies an important
strand of Supreme Court jurisprudence: "prison security
exception, trump individconcerns will, virtually without
10 3
ual autonomy interests."'
Perhaps the most interesting developments came in the
way the Supreme Court chose to interpret Harper in
Riggins, just two years later. The difference in outcomes
may be traced to the difference in court perspectives; the
Court treated Harper as a prison security case while it
read Riggins as a fair trial case; yet, this difference in the
litigants' legal status evidently has no effect on the
potential physiological or neurological impact of the
drugs in question. Nevertheless, side effects language in
Harper(subordinated there because of security reasons) is
privileged in Riggins (where such issues are absent) by
nature of the court's consideration of the question in the
context of a fair trial issue. Justice Thomas' opinion
raises grave issues for defense counsel: Had his position
prevailed, would concerned and competent defense lawyers feel as if they were assuming a risk in ever 0seeking
4
psychiatric help for a defendant awaiting trial?
4. Competency To Be Executed
Still undecided is the important question of whether a
state can involuntarily medicate an individual under a
death sentence so as to make him competent to be

executed. After the Supreme Court determined that an
incompetent defendant cannot be executed 05 (a holding
that it did not extend to cases involving individuals with
mental retardation), 10 6 it agreed to hear, in Perry v.
Louisiana, a case that posed this precise question. 10 7
In Perry,the Louisiana state courts had found that any
due process right the capital defendant might have was
outweighed by two compelling state interests: (1) the
provision of psychiatric care; and (2) the carrying out of a
valid death penalty. 08 After the Supreme Court originally decided to hear the case (to determine whether the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits states from so medicating
death row inmates), it ultimately vacated the lower
court's decision and remanded for further proceedings in
light of its decision in Harperon the scope of a convicted
prisoner's right to refuse. 10 9

On remand, the Louisiana supreme court found, under
state constitutional law, that the state was prohibited
from medicating Perry so as to make him competent to be
executed," l0 a decision that was not re-appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
C. Conclusion
The right to refuse treatment as it applies to individuals in the criminal trial process defies categorization or
organization. It provides us with virtually no guideposts
or benchmarks, save the individual's legal status (e.g.,
whether he is awaiting trial as in Riggins or is serving a
sentence as in Harper).
VI. NO DIRECTION HOME
In a recent article about the ways that jurors construe
mental disability evidence in capital punishment cases, I
characterized our death penalty jurisprudence as "stupefyingly incoherent.""' That lack of coherence can apply
equally to our insanity defense jurisprudence, our incompetence jurisprudence, and our right to refuse treatment
jurisprudence. The reasons for this incoherence are
complex and often confusing." 2 The landscape remains
"bleak.""' 3 In this area of the law, there is, truly, no
direction home.
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